Iran attack and illusion of strategic correction

MA XUEJING/CHINA DAILY

It has been mistakenly argued that the weakening of Iran following attacks by the United States and Israel is a major strategic setback for China. According to this view, Beijing's long-term engagement with Tehran is a central pillar of its Middle East strategy, and the degradation of Iran's capabilities therefore constrains China's global ambitions.

Such interpretations deserve closer scrutiny. Regional developments are not insignificant, but they risk conflating tactical events with structural transformations in the international system. The deeper issue is not whether one partnership has been strained but whether military action can meaningfully shape — or redefine — the trajectory of a global power transition.

Over the past two decades, China has expanded its economic engagement across the Middle East through trade, energy cooperation and infrastructure projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. This engagement has been predominantly commercial. Energy security, maritime connectivity and diversified supply chains are fundamental to China's development model. Stability in the Gulf region is therefore not peripheral to Beijing's interests but structurally embedded in them.

To frame China's relationship with Iran primarily as a geopolitical maneuver reflects a securitized reading of international relations. China is the world's largest importer of crude oil. Prolonged instability in the Middle East would increase costs, heighten risks, and undermine the predictability essential to global trade. For an economy deeply integrated into global markets, systemic instability cannot be a strategic asset.

This does not imply that China's foreign policy is devoid of strategic calculation. Like all major countries, Beijing cultivates partnerships that advance its economic and security priorities. Yet its approach has differed from traditional alliance-based security architectures. Rather than constructing formal military blocs, China has emphasized economic integration, infrastructure development and participation in multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and expanded cooperation under the BRICS framework.

The tendency in some Western analyses to describe a cohesive anti-Western axis risks reviving Cold War mentalities in a far more complex and interdependent world. Today's international environment is characterized less by rigid ideological blocs and more by overlapping networks of cooperation and competition. Many countries maintain economic ties with multiple major powers simultaneously, reflecting pragmatic national interests rather than exclusive alignment.

Structural power in the 21st century is increasingly rooted in technological capacity, industrial scale, financial networks and market depth. These dimensions evolve gradually and are not easily reversed by regional episodes.

The bigger concern raised by recent events is the growing normalization of military instruments as tools of geopolitical adjustment. When the use of force is framed as a mechanism to "correct" strategic imbalances, the international system risks entering a cycle in which coercion replaces institutional coordination. Such dynamics are particularly destabilizing in an era defined by deep economic interdependence.

Global supply chains, energy markets, digital infrastructure and climate governance all depend on predictability. Escalatory patterns in strategically sensitive regions introduce systemic uncertainty that extends beyond local actors. The Middle East, situated at the crossroads of major energy routes and maritime corridors, plays a pivotal role in this architecture.

China's long-standing diplomatic position emphasizes respect for sovereignty, non-interference and negotiated solutions. Whether one agrees with every aspect of this approach, the principle that stability should take precedence over escalation reflects the realities of an interconnected global economy. Durable security cannot be sustained solely through episodic demonstrations of military capability; it requires institutional frameworks capable of managing competition.

It is also essential to place these developments within the broader shift of economic gravity toward Asia. This transformation is not contingent upon a single bilateral relationship. It reflects sustained industrial upgrading, technological innovation, and demographic scale across large parts of the region. The redistribution of economic weight is structural and cumulative.

No single regional episode can fundamentally alter that trajectory. Conversely, no major power can secure long-term stability by relying predominantly on coercive instruments in a system shaped by interdependence.

The challenge for leading economies — including China and the US — is not to eliminate competition, but to manage it within frameworks that prevent global fragmentation. The international order is undergoing recalibration. Institutions built in the mid-20th century face pressures generated by new centers of economic gravity. Reform, adaptation and expanded representation are inevitable components of this transition. Narratives that reduce complex structural change to binary victories or defeats risk obscuring the real stakes.

The key question is not whether one country has constrained another's regional influence in the short term. It is whether the global system can evolve toward a more inclusive and balanced model of governance. That evolution requires dialogue, economic cooperation, and institutional reform rather than reliance on force as a primary instrument of adjustment.

Military actions may produce immediate tactical outcomes, but they do not determine the deeper currents of global transition. The defining challenge of the 21st century lies not in demonstrating the capacity to disrupt, but in constructing frameworks capable of accommodating change while preserving stability.

The author is a Brazilian political economist and former professor at the University of Brasília.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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